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Article 6

Monopoly Pricing in a Time of Shortage
James L Serota*

I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the electric power industry has been heavily regulated
at both the federal and state levels. Recently, the industry has been
evolving towards increasing emphasis on market competition and less
pervasive regulation. Much of the initial impetus for change has
occurred during periods of reduced demand and increased supply. More
recently, increases in demand and supply shortages have led to
brownouts, rolling blackouts, price spikes and accusations of "price
gouging."' The purpose of this paper is to examine the underlying
economic and legal bases for regulation and antitrust actions, and the
antitrust ground rules for assessing liability for "monopoly pricing in
times of shortage." In this author's view, price changes in response to
demand are the normal reaction of a competitive market, and efforts to
limit price changes in the name of "price gouging" represent an effort to
return to pervasive regulation of electricity. The antitrust rules of
monopolization do not and should not change in response to shortage
conditions. To change those rules to respond to price changes that are
market driven, not market power driven, defeats the purpose of
competition and the antitrust rules that govern it.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE
The California energy crisis has led economists to different
conclusions regarding its root causes. MIT Economists Paul Joskow
and Edward Kahn concluded that an inordinate number of plants were
taken offline for maintenance in the summer of 2000 when the price
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spikes were at their peak. They think that this behavior is consistent
with the withholding of some capacity to raise the price of electricity
produced by other units of the same firm, an indicia of market power.
Harvard's William Hogan and Scott Harvey of LECG, a consulting
firm, "argue that generators in California priced above marginal cost,
not because they had market power, but because [of bidding procedures
in California's auction market]." 3 The independent system operator
("ISO") reserve power auction was conducted after the power-exchange
auction.
This sequential feature converted the day-ahead auction from an
everyone-gets-the-market-price auction (and thus generators would
bid at marginal cost to ensure being selected to produce as long as
costs were covered) to a pay-as-you-bid auction in which all
participants, if selected, receive what4 they bid rather than the
(potentially) higher market-clearing price.
Ratepayers are not responsive to price
signals because these users are
5
not charged real time marginal prices.
Similarly, University of California-Berkeley economist Steven Stoft
concluded, "[t]he failure of consumers to respond [because of price
controls] is the fundamental flaw that makes prices reach exorbitant
levels when there is a little scarcity or when suppliers have even a little
market power." 6 University of Maryland and Resources for the Future
economist Tim Brennan also suggested that the California procedures
7
created incentives for high market-clearing prices.
The rules of the auction allowed generators to offer different amounts
of electricity at different prices rather than all of their output at one
price. Under those rules, generators had the incentive to offer a small
amount of their output at very high prices because, if the high bid was
accepted, they would receive that price for all their output. And if the
bid was not accepted, the generators would lose only the sale of a
small fraction of their possible output. Normally such bidding
behavior would be unprofitable because the probability of the high
bid's being accepted would be small, but, in a very tight supply

2. Jerry Taylor & Peter VanDoren, California's Electricity Crisis: What's Going On, Who's to
Blame, and What to Do, POL'Y ANALYSIS, July 3, 2001, at 12.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The phenomenon is not limited to electricity. Third party payment of healthcare often leads
to over-utilization of services. Healthcare economists call this "the moral hazard of insurance."
See, e.g., Med. Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982).
6. Taylor & VanDoren, supra note 2, at 12.
7. Id.
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situation, the probability of the bid's being accepted8 rises
considerably, and the opportunity cost of the unsold power falls.
Whether these conditions are unique to California or not, it is
important to understand the economics of an energy shortage without
regard to factors which are sui generis to any one particular jurisdiction.
LECG's Scott Harvey and Professor William W. Hogan of Harvard
accurately describe the typical pricing behavior of a control area, i.e., a
9
market, in shortage.

Figur 7
Supply and Demand in a Reserve Shortage

Demand

In a capacity shortage, ancillary service prices will be high, and these
high ancillary service prices will be reflected in energy prices. In
shortage hours, the price of energy will reflect both incremental
generating costs and the capacity price. Comparisons of the price of
energy in shortage situations to incremental generation costs will
always therefore find that energy prices appearto be "too high," but
this would not reflect the exercise of market power, but only a

8. Id. at 11-12.
9. Scott Harvey & William W. Hogan, Issues in the Analysis of Market Power in California
19 (Oct. 27, 2000), availableat http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-.WHogan.CBG.Ksg/HHMktPwr1027.pdf (unpublished manuscript).
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mistaken criterionfor the competitive level of energy prices.... Since
all bids would be accepted in some market in a shortage situation,
competitive suppliers have an incentive to submit above-cost bids in
an expected shortage situation in order
to ensure that they are paid the
0
market-clearing price of capacity. 1
The clear message is that in a supply and demand imbalance, the
shortage conditions are the price givers, not the market participants.
Certain bidding strategies might increase profits for some "inframarginal generators" with favorable long-term contracts. However,
while such strategies might increase overall profitability by bidding
successively small amounts at a very high price, they are not ordinarily
profitable but for a tight supply situation." It is the rules and the tight
supply situation that together act as the price giver, not the supplier. If
the rules permit a generator to bid varying amounts of output at
increasing prices until a clearing price is reached, the inframarginal
producers do not need to engage in that type of bidding strategy in a
shortage in order to increase their overall profitability. A market
structure with a diverse mix of suppliers including "peaking plants,"
marginal producers with small output, is a market circumstance that is
sufficient to cause higher prices in a tight supply situation. Such plants
are ordinarily designed to operate only in tight supply situations where
higher cost production is profitable. This is not an exercise of market
power but a reflection of scarcity rents. 12 The important lesson of these
market circumstances is that a shortage imbalance in a market structure
with a widely diverse mix of suppliers will cause prices to rise
appreciably during a shortage. As Professor Hogan has stated, the
conclusion "that energy prices appear to be 'too high' . . . reflect[s]
[not] the exercise of market power, but only a mistaken criterion for the
13
competitive level of energy prices."'
III.

THE ECONOMICS OF MONOPOLIZATION

The economics of monopolization are generally considered to be
distinct from those of scarcity or shortage.
The economics of

10. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
11. Taylor & VanDoren, supra note 2, at 12.
12. In a 1983 Yale Law Journal article on airline deregulation, the author distinguishes
between scarcity rents that pay for the risk of under-utilization in light of high fixed costs and
monopoly profit arising from the creation of barriers to entry and reduction of output below full
utilization. Stephen E. Creager, Airline Deregulationand Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J. 319
(1983). Higher than "normal" prices in a period of full capacity utilization are consistent with the
former, not the latter.
13. Harvey & Hogan, supra note 9, at 19.
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monopolization are essentially the same as those of price fixing. As
Professor Hovenkamp describes in his classic 1989 article:
The simplest overcharge case involves a monopolist or cartel member
charging its short-run profit-maximizing price. Figure 1 illustrates. In
perfect competition, a firm sets price equal to marginal cost, or Pc, and
output is Q. However, the monopolist or cartel will reduce output to
the point that marginal cost equals marginal revenue, or Qm, and price
will rise to Pm. Rectangle 2-3-5-4 becomes a transfer of wealth from
consumers to the monopolist, Triangle 4-5-6 represents the traditional
"deadweight loss" from monopoly-that is, resources that are lost
because they are denied to consumers but do not show up as gains to
the monopolist either. If the demand curve is linear, triangle 4-5-6
will be exactly half as big as rectangle 2-3-5-4. Assuming the wealth
transfer caused by this monopoly is $100, the deadweight loss will be
$50. If the demand curve is not linear, the deadweight loss triangle
can be greater than or less than half the wealth transfer. 14
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The chart above describes an industry that is conducive to "6supra
competitive pricing," a consequence of the exercise of monopoly.
Monopoly power is the "power to control market prices or exclude
competition." 15 As the previous graph shows, reduced capacity causes
marginal prices to rise above marginal cost with a wealth transfer to the
14. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 44 REC. OF THE A5s'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 493, 496-97 (1989).
15. United States v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemnours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
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monopolist and a deadweight loss to society. The question in a shortage
market, therefore, is not whether the seller is exceeding a historical base
level of competitive prices, but rather whether the seller has the ability
to raise prices unilaterally in the market. Is the putative monopolist a
price giver or a price taker, or is the market or some other actor, such as
government regulation, dictating the conditions that cause "supra
competitive" pricing above marginal cost? In a shortage, unless the
shortage is caused by reduced capacity, there is no "deadweight loss" to
society.16 Because the economics and the graph described by
Hovenkamp are distinct from that described by Hogan and Harvey,
should the case law track the economics, or should the law of
monopolization and scarcity merge because both describe a condition of
pricing above marginal cost?
IV. WHAT ARE THE ANTITRUST RULES OF MONOPOLIZATION, AND Do
THEY CHANGE IN TIMES OF SHORTAGE?

If the issue is what is monopoly pricing in times of shortage, the
question to ask is whether this industry is subject to monopolization.
The mainstream view of the Sherman Act begins with the Standard Oil
case. 17 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
summarized the history of the pre-1890 common law including the
English statutory prohibition against monopoly and the effects that
flowed from it, i.e., the power
to fix prices and injure the public and the
18
power to limit production.
The Supreme Court interpreted section 2 of the Sherman Act as a
corollary to section 1.19 As a result, various forms of anticompetitive
practices enumerated in section 1 could not be used as a limitation on
the mechanism by which monopoly and its evils could be achieved.2 °
This interpretation of the Sherman Act led the Court to order the
21
dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust and the American Tobacco Trust.
While the words "restraint of trade" and "monopolize" used in
Sections 1 and 2 take their initial meaning from pre-1890 common and
statutory law, they are redefined to effectuate a statutory policy of
protecting the public against wrongs which the Congress thought
might flow from situations, popularly called "monopoly," where
16. Deadweight loss is the social cost of monopoly caused by the reduction in the available
good to society separate from the wealth transfer to a monopolist.
17. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
18. Id. at51-58.
19. Id. at 50-51.
20. Id. at 59.
21. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (191 1).
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competition-by whatever means-was unduly limited. The Standard
Oil opinion defines the object of the Sherman Act, as well as the
common law, as the prohibition of all "contracts or acts which it was
considered had a monopolistic tendency, especially those which were
thought to unduly diminish competition," and of 22acts "producing or
tending to produce the consequences of monopoly."
Whether the focus is on specific acts of conspiracy or deliberate acts
that produce monopoly, the basic object of the antitrust laws has been to
focus on the ability of a competitor or a group of competitors to dictate
price to the market. In the seminal Alcoa opinion, Judge Augustus
Hand stated:
Starting

. .

. with the authoritative premise that all contracts fixing

prices are unconditionally prohibited, the only possible difference
between them and a monopoly is that while a monopoly necessarily
involves an equal, or even greater, power to fix prices, its mere
existence might be thought not to constitute an exercise of that power.
That distinction is nevertheless purely formal; it would be valid only
so long as the monopoly remained wholly inert; it would disappear as
soon as the monopoly began to operate; for, when it did-that is, as
soon as it began to sell at all-it must sell at some price and the only
price at which it could sell is a price which it itself fixed.2 3
The case law is now clear that under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2, liability for monopolization requires the possession of
monopoly power in a relevant market and the willful acquisition or
24
maintenance of that power.
Attempts to redefine the law of monopolization for shortage
conditions have generally been unsuccessful.
In 1973, Agrico
Chemicals refused to supply certain products used in fertilizer
production to anyone other than long-term customers. 25 The fertilizer
maker sued its prior supplier of raw materials for monopolization,
contending that by virtue of a shortage, each producer becomes a
monopolist of its own source of scarce materials and has a responsibility
to supply competitors with adequate amounts of the product
effectively. 26
The court rejected the "shortage" theory of
monopolization, citing an earlier decision by then Judge Stevens of the

22. REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN.'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS II (Mar.
31, 1955).
23. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427-28 (2d Cir. 1945).
24. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
25. Cent. Chem. Corp. v. Agrico Chem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 533, 538 (D. Md. 1982).
26. Id. at 538-39.
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Seventh Circuit in Mullis v. ARCO Petroleum Corp.27 In Mullis, Judge
Stevens rejected the argument that a shortage wherein supplies are hard
to obtain causes the overall market to be redefined. 28 Furthermore, the
court stated that restraints by the government during the shortage do not
make a monopolist out of a company with small market share where at
least twenty other companies were selling the same generic product,
albeit subject to the same government imposed restraints. 29 As the court
held, such a theory would make monopolists of all other competitors as
well.
Similarly, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,30 the Court reviewed the consequences of pricing above marginal
costs, i.e., supercompetitive pricing. The Court determined that
[o]nly if those higher prices are a product of nonmarket forces has
competition suffered. If prices rise in response to an excess of
demand over supply ....

the market is functioning in a competitive

the
manner. Consumers are not injured from the perspective of
31
antitrust laws by the price increases; they are in fact causing them.
The lesson of prior energy shortages is that uncoordinated price
changes by participants, even with significant shares but less than
market power, are not indicia of monopolization. They cannot cause
price increases but for excess demand, supply shortages, artificial
bidding rules or artificial restraints on the terms of competition. Prior
efforts to impose antitrust liability where industry suppliers have
that typically attributed to a
substantially less market share than
32
monopolist have been unsuccessful.
Consider, for example, the consequences of imposing antitrust
liability on suppliers who price above an industry average marginal
cost. California bidding rules, as previously described, determined that

27. Id. at 550-51 (citing Mullis v. ARCO Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290, 297-99 (7th Cir.
1974)).
28. Mullis, 502 F.2d at 297.
29. Id.
30. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
31. Id. at 232.
32. The late Senator Philip Hart, of Michigan, introduced the Industrial Reorganization Act of
1972, S. 1167, the so-called "shared monopoly act," which imposed antitrust penalties for noncolluding companies with relatively lower market shares than normally found in "monopolized"
markets. See also WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY (1969), reprinted

in ANTITRUST TRADE REGULATION REPORT, No. 411, Special Supplement Part 11 (1969). With
the rejection of the FTC's efforts to prosecute the cereal companies for a "shared oligopoly," in
19,898 (1972), initial
Kellogg Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
decision vacated and complaint dismissed with prejudice, 99 FTC 8 (1982), these theories have
had no intellectual support in over 25 years.
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each additional supplier bid the expected market clearing price. 33
Higher prices appear at least in part to be a product of these rules, not
the exercise of monopoly power condemned by the antitrust laws. Even
if those bidding rules were not in place, as Hogan, Harvey, Taylor and
VanDoren noted, the price would have risen appreciably above
marginal cost for many producers. Most energy markets have a wide
range of generators with varying capacities and fuel sources. The
smallest are usually peaking plants of 100 megawatts or less, fueled by
natural gas. The plant is designed only to provide reserve capacity or
ancillary services, and is available to supply energy only at the times of
highest demand. Its high cost structure is designed to achieve
profitability only when demand is at its highest and prices are
substantially above marginal cost for most other producers. It may
choose to withhold its capacity during most hours of most days because
if it offered its capacity at a price similar to that of a larger "must-run"
nuclear plant, it would lose money. In markets such as California where
the market capacity is approximately 58,000 megawatts, to impose
antitrust monopolization liability for a producer of 2/10 of one percent
because at certain peak times, it and similarly situated plants may be the
only capacity available, strains the common meaning of "price giver."
Yet, because of certain government regulations including bidding
procedures, sales by such plants and sales by traders without any
physical capacity at prices above historical levels or those of larger
more efficient competitors provoke cries of price gouging. As stated in
Brooke Group as well as in Central Chemical, in such circumstances,
market forces or government restraints are the price givers, market
participants are the price takers. 34 It would strain precedent and
antitrust theory to impose monopolization liability for small but
relatively higher cost suppliers.
V. THE ROLE OF REGULATION

Regulation is a constitutionally approved alternative to competition in
industries that are "affected with the public interest. 3 5 An industry
where one firm has an exclusive right to produce a particular good or
service is typically referred to as a "natural monopoly."
Such
exclusivity may produce efficiencies and avoid disruptive duplication of
service but regulation is a necessary corollary. Regulation protects the
33.
34.
Supp.
35.

Harvey & Hogan, supra note 9, at 9.
Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209; Cent. Chem. Corp. v. Agrico Chem. Co., 531 F.
533 (D. Md. 1982).
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
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public against the exercise of monopoly power by "natural
monopolists." At the same time, it insures that the supplier receives
"reasonable compensation to enable the company to operate
successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to track capital, and to
compensate its investors for the risks assumed. 36 The concept of just
and reasonable rates, which is embodied in section 205 of the Federal
Power Act and various state regulatory statutes, permits a "reasonable
rate of return" for the cost of providing non-discriminatory service for
the public at large. 37 This is the essence of cost of service rate making.
The rate to be charged to the public is based upon a rate base composed
of "used and useful" capital equipment in service, together with the
variable costs of providing that service, measured against expected
demand for that service. The revenue necessary to achieve a
"reasonable return" divided by the anticipated demand, yields a "just
and reasonable rate" to be charged to various classes of customers. This
process "guarantees" a reasonable rate of return and often caps a
maximum rate of return. Excess profits are often returned to ratepayers.
Stability and reliability substitute for risk and reward in this
environment. So long as costs are prudently incurred, subject to review
by the regulator, they are included in the rate base calculation and the
ratepayer bears the risk of increased cost due to changed market
conditions. On the other hand, service providers are encouraged to plan
prudently for changes in market conditions and to avoid exposure to
undue rate increases to ratepayers. A return on capital investment is
typically amortized over an extended "useful life" in order to recover a
reasonable return on investments through less than market-based
increased prices during periods of high demand. At the same time, this
assures a reasonable return during periods of low demand for costs that
were prudently incurred.
In addition, some degree of cross
subsidization between rate classes is often present, resulting in higher
rates for commercial users and lower rates for residential users than
would ordinarily occur in a competitive environment.
Regulation is designed to protect the public against "monopoly
power," not "excessive" prices during periods of high demand and
insufficient supply. However, regulation has the latter effect by limiting
the maximum price that can be charged without regulatory approval.
Regulation is designed to avoid supply shortages by not focusing on
short-term price signals, yet it has the effect of minimizing price
increases whether the source is market conditions or "monopoly
36.
37.

Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944).
16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2000).
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power." Thus, the long-term effect of regulation results in a smoothing
of price swings between periods of high demand and low demand so
that a more even "just and reasonable" rate is charged to consumers
from one period to the next. Capacity increases in response to
engineering needs, not necessarily overall economics and price signals.
Yet the perceived misallocation of cost among different classes of
customers and perceived inflexible pricing structure, particularly for
commercial users with viable alternatives in periods of low demand,
provided
seeds for the current deregulation movement in the United
38
States.
VI.

DEREGULATION MEANS PRICE FLUCTUATION

The thrust of the initiative to deregulate electricity has been directed
to generation. While transmission has been the subject of FERC
initiatives designed to reduce control of the natural monopoly of
transmission, alternative competitive transmission grids are unlikely to
be built. 39 Similarly, while certain aspects of the distribution process
may be subject to competition, particularly related services, an
alternative system of wires is not contemplated. Most industry
observers believe that the benefit of competition can only be derived
from deregulation and open access to competitive generation.
Price fluctuations are a normal part of a competitive business. In a
deregulated industry where demand changes rapidly by the hour, day
and time of year, this is particularly true. In congressional hearings of
June 4, 1997, James Serota stated:
Competition is like democracy-you can't predict the outcome.
Competition means that when supply exceeds demand as it does in
various places on the East Coast, you should reap the benefit of
competition and get lower prices. Competition does not mean that
when demand exceeds supply, as it may this summer in Illinois and
40
Wisconsin, that you then suppress competition and retain regulation.

38. RICHARD J. GILBERT & EDWARD P. KAHN, Competition and Institutional Change in U.S.
Electric Power Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION

(1996).
39. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order Nos. 888-888A, 75 F.E.R.C. %61,080, 1996
FERC LEXIS 777 (1996); Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (2000), issued
as FERC Order No. 2000.
40. Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 123 (1997) (statement of
James Serota).
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Implicit in the use of a term such as "price-gouging" during periods
of price spikes are lingering traces of regulation. 4 1 Subsumed in price
regulation is the concept of just and reasonable rates. Neither rates nor
profits will go too high or too low. When generating plants were
divested by investor-owned utilities, they generally lost the safety net of
price protection. At the time of such sales, such generators usually
received market-based rate-making authority from the FERC. Implicit
in the reasoning of government authorities who complain of "price
gouging" is the theory that prices are too high because they are above
marginal cost, i.e., they are not just and unreasonable, and they must be
kept at a just and reasonable price. The proponents of such theories
never argue that when the economic cycle turns down, the "putative"
"price-gouging" supplier should be protected against losses.
This is reminiscent of the take or pay controversy of the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Shortages occurred, and producers entered into longterm contracts for supplies of gas at prices above prior historical levels.
Customers desperate for natural gas "locked up" this capacity. When
the shortage ended and spot prices dropped, customers tried to avoid
these high-priced agreements. They were not successful.4 2 Long term
contracts to avoid the ravages of fluctuation are common in many
industries. In such contracts, there is a trade-off between the possible
short-term benefit of spot prices versus the long-term certainty of
supply and price stability. In an unregulated environment where the
consuming public has chosen to be free from regulation in order to
make that trade-off an individual choice, individual consumers can
make an informed choice in favor of price or stability but should not ask
to be relieved of their choice if the choice does not prove wise. 43 In the
cycle of fluctuation attendant to electricity pricing, prices must be
viewed in a continuum. Monopoly pricing is not evinced by periodic,
even precipitous, price spikes in response to supply shortages. Such
price movement cannot be disassociated from periodic price drops
below marginal costs during periods of low demand.
41. See SEABRON ADAMSON & KEVIN WELLENIUS, DETERMINATION OF HORIZONTAL
MARKET POWER ABUSE IN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 19-25 (Frontier Econ., Working
Paper No. FE99-01, 2000). Adamson and Wellenius argue for a "no market power" standard of
liability whereby rather than determine whether a particular supplier or trader has market power,
regulators should determine whether the market is capable of pricing at marginal cost. Id. As the
authors candidly admit, this is a return to price regulation. Id.
42. See, e.g., Illinois ex. rel. Bums v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481, 148385 (7th Cir. 1991).
43. Ironically, California regulators concerned with "price gouging" and capacity shortages
recently entered into long term supply contracts at the market peak and are being criticized for
this choice as well.
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VII. MARKET RESPONSES TO "PRICE GOUGING"THE DEREGULATION PROCESS

The deregulation of generation began when investor-owned utilities
a
either "voluntarily" or by statute were forced to divest generation."
There was substantial concern that prices that would be recovered by
the sale of those plants would be less than the book value of those
assets.4 5 This concern was based on the perception that prices and
demand at that time were low, and that prices for assets in an
unregulated environment would generate less revenue than in a
regulated environment. Accordingly, it was thought the value of those
assets, represented by the long-term profit stream from such reduced
revenue, would result in a substantially reduced cost recovery for those
assets. Many investor owned utilities were concerned that they would
be saddled with "stranded costs" representing the difference between
the regulatory value of the asset and the actual market value of the asset.
While a regulated asset can be expected to pay for itself over a
relatively even revenue stream, an unregulated asset stream will be the
subject of high and low revenue years which are not guaranteed. If the
regulation of the asset is interrupted in midstream, there may be a
shortfall, a stranded or strandable cost, over the remainder of the asset's
useful life. The timing of the interruption is arbitrary, but since the
pressure to deregulate is often the greatest when the public benefits
appear to be greatest, i.e., low demand and low prices, the expectation
of a shortfall is at its peak.
In many instances that was not the case. The sale prices of the assets
were equal to or more than the book value of the assets because the
buyers correctly anticipated that energy prices would rise and they
would recover their acquisition costs through prices that were higher
than the prevailing prices in the past. Because these stranded costs were
reduced and in some cases capital gains were achieved, ratepayers in
those jurisdictions reaped substantial benefit in the form of lower or
more stable rates than that which would otherwise have occurred due to
46
stranded costs.

44. For an example of deregulation by statute, see, for example, A.B. 1890 (Chapter 854,
Statutes of 1996) (deregulation in California).
45. Taylor & VanDoren, supra note 2, at 4.
46. See Colin Drukker, Economic Consequences of Electricity Deregulation:A Case Study of
San Diego Gas & Electric in a DeregulatedElectricity Market, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 291, 299-300
(2000). San Diego Gas and Electric earned $262 million capital gain due to the competitive
bidding process for its Encina power plant. Id. at 299. This result was not isolated. Overall,
SDG&E earned $600 million in profit from the sale of its generating plants. Id.
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If new buyers are not allowed the ability to charge whatever prices
the market will bear in order to recover their asset purchase costs made
in a competitive environment, it would frustrate their expectation at the
time of sale and the risk which they took in believing that they could
recover the value of their investment in a free market environment. A
sophisticated buyer of such assets understands there will be price and
demand fluctuations and factors that into its revenue model before
making its bid. It would also reduce the price of any future sale of
assets, as future buyers would have to consider the possibility that such
assets should be discounted for the risk of reregulation.
Sophisticated sellers, particularly those with default or provider of
last resort responsibility, often enter into transition contracts with sellers
to assure themselves of adequate supply at a reasonable price. In the
absence of that, they prudently hedge their known obligations either
financially or physically. Failure to hedge for market fluctuations is not
an indicia of market failure or the exercise of monopoly power that
reflects on the buyer's bona fides.
Moreover, allowing such reregulation of the rates in response to
precipitous price rises, i.e., "price gouging," and diminishing the
acquirer's profit stream would in effect be a double windfall recovery to
ratepayers as they had received the benefit discounted to present value
at the time of the sale of that asset and would in effect receive the
discount on the expected rates from a new regulatory cap. Had the
buyers' model been incorrect, would ratepayers or their surrogates offer
to tender the excess sale price to the sellers? Not likely. In the face of
the current economic slowdown and reduced demand for electric power,
there is no evidence that they are doing so now.
VIII. CONCLUSION

When a political choice is made for competition in favor of
regulation or vice versa, the benefits and risks of each are known and
understood. To impose regulatory amendments on the market without
providing a regulatory floor on risk frustrates the deregulation process
and distorts the concept of monopolization and monopoly pricing.
"Price-gouging" is a short-term epithet of those who take only the
benefits and accept no risks of competition. When a market dictates the
price, the market is functioning as intended. When a seller or sellers
dictate the price independent of that market, only then do the evils of
monopoly arise.

